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MEDIATED 
CONSTITUTIONALITY AS A 
SOLUTION TO SEPARATISM 
Damien Kingsbury 
The idea of autonomy or other forms of sovereign devolution has been pro-
posed as a viable compromise model in the resolution of claims to separatism. 
This chapter will consider the meaning and method of application of 
autonomy or other sub-state political models, and assess whether a semi-
independent status can adequately address separatist claims. It will consider 
the formation of post-colonial states, the failure of many such states to 
adequately represent ethnic minorities, and the so-called third wave of 
nationalism in which national or proto-national groupings seek territorial 
sovereignty. The chapter draws on case studies from Indonesia's Aceh and 
Papua provinces, Sri Lanka's Eelam and the Philippines' Bangsamoro, and 
the failure of the autonomy option in East Timor. 
The idea of autonomy has been available to sub-state entities since before 
the period of Westphalian states, and can be seen as having its origins in 
the allocation of devolved local rule in empires, or points of local political 
organization within a wider and overarching political constellation. In the 
post-Westphalian world of sovereign states, autonomy has generally been 
allowed to accommodate sub-national or ethnically distinct geopolitical 
entities that, for strategic reasons, have been obliged to accept incorporation 
into larger states. That is to say, the idea of autonomy is neither new nor 
16 
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novel, and has been accepted as a viable method of securing regional strategic 
interests while at the same time encouraging state loyalty via a degree of 
political "looseness" on one hand while confirming a rationale for state 
cohesion on the other. 
Where a state has been established without due regard for internally 
differentiated constituent parts, as in the case of many unitary and centrally 
administered post-colonial states, a devolution of centralized state authority 
to a variety of sub-state models may be undertaken through a process of 
mediation. Such mediation applies to both the process by which such a 
devolved sub-state outcome is achieved, and to the outcome which locates the 
devolved sub-state entity between the polarities of absolute self-determination 
and absolute state sovereignty. 
This mediated compromise, usually around autonomy or a similar form of 
local self-government, has been proposed as a viable model for the resolution 
of claims to separatism, sometimes in its own right and sometimes as a step 
along the path to full independence. 1 The terminology that has gained recent 
currency in such a process is "earned sovereignty". Earned sovereignty is an 
attempt to construct a standardized model for conflict resolution of separatist 
disputes, although implying a number of criteria that are not always necessary 
and which may not assist in achieving the desired outcome. Moreover, the 
meaning of the term is problematic. A more useful term, if one not yet 
current in the literature, is "mediated constitutionality". 
This underlying proposal of mediated constitutionality is based on the 
assumption that actions in order to achieve or oppose separatism are either 
unresolvable and/ or create more harm than they resolve. That is, while there 
might be strong grounds for separatist claims or for opposing separatist 
claims, the conflict that can arise in support of or opposition to such claims 
can outweigh the benefit any such claims or opposition to it might propose 
to bring. Hence, addressing the first principle causes of conflict might be 
possible other than through the creation of a separate state. 
In particular, the idea of autonomy or related forms of sub-state 
devolution of authority are generally intended not just as a compromise 
between competing or mutually incompatible positions, but also as attempts 
to redress some of the fundamental failures of a pre-existing state in its role 
as the institutionalized representative of its citizens. The state has, or should 
have, a series of civic responsibilities towards its citizens which might be 
regarded as first principle reasons for its existence. Such responsibilities 
include, or should include, equal and consistent rule of law (lex as the origin 
of legitimacy) guaranteeing freedom with domination.2 
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Within the context of self-identifying groups, where legitimacy is not 
established in either normative or positive terms, or where legitimacy is 
held to have been lost or to not apply in relation to a specific people or a 
specific territory, such people will tend to seek remedial action. For a given 
people or territory, the mandate for such remedial action might become 
more compelling when an alternative source of legitimacy is identified 
and acknowledged. This is, often, the case with self-identifying groups 
within a reasonably geographically coherent area that do not acknowledge 
the legitimacy of a ruler from a separate location over the claimed area, or 
amongst whom that sense of legitimacy as legal inclusion has never been 
adequately established or has since been lost. 
The people of post-colonial states usually have high expectations 
of independence prior to independence being granted. Yet most post-
colonial states usually do not have the capacity to meet pre-independence 
expectations, and in many cases, capacity is actually lower than under the 
colonial regime, following the withdrawal of skilled administration and 
capital, and often (although not universally) due to the destruction resulting 
from attritional wars of liberation. 3 In the face of rising popular frustration 
and limited institutional capacity to respond to it, many post-colonial 
states begin to limit political space, resorting to authoritarian or dictatorial 
political practices. 4 
Where the limitation of political space takes the form of a patron-client 
relationship with ethnic majorities, ethnic minorities can feel alienated 
(victimized, even) and thus retreat to the ethnically and geographically 
specific. It is but a short step from geo-specific ethnic identification to 
claims to alternative nationhood and, from there on, to the claim for a state 
as its geo-institutional manifestation. Separation as a solution to this civic 
shortfall frequently becomes a goal in its own right, in which the end of 
the process justifies the means by which it gets there. This may mean that 
the separatist movement loses sight of the reasons that gave rise to it in the 
first place. Regarding the case studies, they each conform to a more broad 
or general type of failure of the post~colonial state to adequately, evenly 
and consistently address the concerns and interests of a specific minority of 
its citizens (Kingsbury 2008). 
However, if it is the intention of such separatist or sub-state actors to 
redress what might be termed a civic shortfall of the state, then the focus 
may shift from separatism as a goal in its own right towards addressing the 
shortfall that has originally motivated the separatist claim. This might be 
termed a return to first principles of conflict resolution, a logic that was 
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brought to bear in the resolution of the Aceh conflict in 2005 (see Kingsbury 
2006, pp. 20, 121-22), and has since been viewed by some as constituting 
a basis for a model to be applied in other conflict contexts: "the tremendous 
achievement of the Helsinki process is plain to see. Aceh has become a 
possible model for resolving conflicts in other parts of the world" (Aspinall 
2006, p. 4). 
AUTONOMY AS A SUB-STATE MODEL 
The idea of autonomy has an ambiguous or variable meaning. This was 
noted in the Aceh peace talks, when Finnish mediator Martti Ahtisaari inad-
vertently used the Finnish term that translated directly as "self-government" 
(erityisitsehallinto) when intending to mean "autonomy" (erityisautonomia). 
Even the term "self-government", which was subsequently adopted by the 
Free Aceh Movement during the talks as the basis for its negotiable claim, 
was vague enough for both Indonesian negotiators and Acehnese to ask 
what it meant, prompting the quip that the meaning of "self-government" 
would be defined by the outcome of those negotiations. 
Etymologically, autonomy derives from the Ancient Greek for "self" 
(auto) and "law'' (nomos), and implies not independence in a geo-strategic 
sense, or other forms of absolute separation from another political 
community, but the ability to make laws (in practice, self-rule) for one's 
own community. In a more practical sense, the meaning of autonomy is 
that which is given to it via any mediated process. The specific content of 
autonomy is thus not fixed (autonomy can come in degrees), and is usually 
derived as a consequence of "negotiation which, other than in distinctly 
unequal contexts, implies compromise and the consequent loss of elements 
of the competing claims, e.g. independence on one hand and absolute 
sovereignty on the other. 
In Indonesia, where the principle of granting autonomy (lit. otonomi 
khussus, or "special autonomy'') was applied in the cases of Aceh and West 
Papua from 2001, the term implied a constrained form of local admini-
stration, primarily in relation to the allocation of a promised increase 
in revenues. Autonomy was likely granted to the Bangsamoro homeland 
region of the southern Philippines but, similarly to Indonesia, has little 
substantive content and was undermined in practice. In Sri Lanka, 
autonomy has been suggested as a model for resolving separatist conflict 
and was promised under the 1987 Inda-Lanka Accord. However, it was 
not implemented and more recent models now fall short of the claim of 
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complete independence by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE, 
or Tamil Tigers).5 
Accepting in a practical sense that, as a mediated political arrange-
ment, autonomy means whatever the content of any agreement as to its 
implementation states it to mean, the next question is whether autonomy 
can adequately address the types of political claims that inspire separatism. 
Very often in order to promote their claims, separatist movements adopt 
absolutist rhetoric, such as "separatism/victory/freedom or death" and an 
ideology around sacrifice (consider, for example, the LTTE Black Tiger 
suicide battalion and the institutionally endorsed cult within the LTTE of 
suicide upon capture). This is necessary in order to establish a position from 
which to prosecute initial political claims. Very often, a nationalist ideology 
is built up around such claims, or is concomitant with them. 6 
Given the commitment of separatist movements to independence, then, 
there remains the question as to whether a lesser status such as autonomy 
or self-government can provide an acceptable mediated outcome. Moreover, 
questions arise as to whether acceptance of such a mediated outcome can 
be understood by separatist movements as just a step on a longer journey 
towards full independence, as per Finland's conversion of autonomy to 
independence from imperial Russia in 1920, and whether or not autonomy 
can be a ploy by central governments to buy off separatist claims and pacify 
a restive population on one hand while undermining both the substance 
and the spirit of any mediated promises on the other. This can be seen 
to have been the case in Bangsamoro under the agreement between the 
Government of the Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front 
in 1996, and by the government of Indonesia in Aceh and West Papua in 
2001. Similarly, autonomy was understood to be code for "integration" in 
the case of East Timor in 19997 and was rejected in favour of the alternative 
position of full independence. Governments may also not accept settlements 
aimed at producing autonomy, particularly if they might lose direct and 
complete control over vital strategic or economic factors. Beyond the political 
commitment of movements towards particular goals, and the bad faith that 
can accompany and undermine mediated compromise agreements, there is 
also doubt as to whether compromise solutions can adequately address the 
claims which give rise to separatism in the first place. 
The claim of a self-identifying bonded political group in turn raises 
the question of "nation", while geo-institutional claims of such a nation 
constitute claims to statehood. Within the context of an established state, the 
claim is thus to one of separation and reconstitution under a distinct and 
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separate state identity. There are three broad views on claims to nationhood. 
The first is primordialist; that particular nations have always existed and 
that they constitute an essentially unchanging social bond. The second, 
"modernist", view is that nations are relatively recent constructions either of 
industrial necessity (Gelner 1983), explicit state programmes (Hobsbawam 
1983, 2004), or technologically induced cultural unity (Anderson 1991). 
A third view is that nations are "ethno-symbolic" unities that cohere 
around symbolic representations of common identification, including 
civic values (Smith 1998, 2003). 
Most states are internally defined by how their social groups are organized, 
if with varying degrees of dynamism, as constituent parts. Post-colonial states 
in particular tend to exhibit vertical or regionally based group tendencies, 
especially where they are constructed from multiple pre-existing ethnicities. 8 
That is, ethnic groups that existed prior to the colonial experience and which 
may have not enjoyed close or comfortable relations with other groups often 
found themselves conjoined in colonial entities which transformed, in the 
post-colonial era, as multi-ethnic states. 
Few such multi-ethnic colonies have made a fully successful transition 
to becoming voluntary states (states in which an overwhelming majority of 
its members freely choose to be citizens); in most cases there has been an 
element of compulsion in accordance with an overt "nation-building" project. 
Where this nation-building project has been predicated upon a higher degree 
of compulsion, and especially where there has been a dominant ethnic group 
among less dominant groups, this has tended to produce a reaction, often 
by way of assertion of a separate identity equally but differently conceived 
as "nation". This then raises two questions, the first being what it is that 
constitutes a nation, and, relatively, how claims to nationhood can be 
assessed. The second question concerns issues of legitimacy, voluntarism 
and compulsion. 
National identity as the basis for the assertion of nationalist claims can 
be characterized in two broad streams. The most common quality of national 
identity is, as noted, based on ethnicity (Smith l 986b, pp. 22-46). A common 
language is the principal mediator through which individuals who may not 
know each other but actually or potentially communicate across distance and 
hence perceive themselves as having a common interest (Anderson 1991). 
However, basing the national project solely on culture, without extending 
that to include wider civic values, raises the prospect of reifying a mythical 
"glorious past" (Smith 1986b, pp. 17 4-208). In reifying itself, ethnicity 
becomes inwardly focused, exclusivist and reactionary. 
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Nations have traditionally tended to exist in relation to a specific 
and usually contiguous and relatively demarcated or delineated territory. 
The territorial reach of nations, or proto-nations, has historically shifted, 
especially prior to the advent of Westphalian sovereignty, and populations 
were often fluid. A key quality necessary for continuing success in sustaining 
national identity is based on concordance around normative shared values 
or the positive codification of plural civil values. This extended idea of 
nationalism comprises what has been termed "civic nationalism", or "civic 
nationality'' (Smith 1998, pp. 210-13). This concept corresponds to a more 
voluntary, inclusive, participatory and open political society (for example, 
liberal democracy). In this, national identity and citizenship are ascribed on 
the basis of commitment to core civic values rather than ethnic origin, thus 
returning to the original meaning of the term ((legitimacy'' (see Seymour 
2000; Habermas 200la, 2001b). Such societies are the ones in which 
voluntarism and legitimacy are joined. 
However, where ethnic bonds are historically weak in relation to the 
state and civic bonds are not evident, states tend to compel '(national" mem-
bership, following, rather than preceding, the creation of the state. Such 
compulsion tends to preclude civic values. That is, not being able to allow 
the full expression of social plurality, the state rules by (often oppressive) law, 
thus denying justice. 
The association of a people with a territory is most likely to be successful 
in being able to assert a claim to that territory if it is relatively compact and 
largely contiguous (Gellner 1983, p. 46). A dispersed territory is, relative to 
population, less easily able to be controlled and hence claimed. Territory is 
identified as a source of livelihood and a site of mutual defence, overlapping 
in the analysis of nationalism by Hobsbawm (Hobsbawm 2004, chap. 
4; Gellner 1983, chap. 3; Smith 1998, pp. 79-82). The centralized and 
externally focused nature of industrial organization and the standardization 
of language it requires can thus be seen as contributing or strengthening 
both the development of a national identity and providing a basis for 
subsequent statehood (Hobsbawn 1983, 1990). That being said, there 
have been instances, however, where the formation of nations and national 
identities has occurred in numerous pre or non-industrial circumstances.9 
If ('nation" implies some formalization of group identity around a 
particular programme, then defence and security systems of the state can 
contribute significantly to this formalization. The group is starkly delineated, 
while membership is often explicitly reconfirmed, and the group goes 
through a relatively high degree of social organization under a coherent 
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executive leadership. In this, grievance by members of a particularly identified 
group which elicits a violent state response may itself be the catalyst for 
nation formation where previously a less formal group identity existed. The 
importance of this feature cannot be overstated, as where outsiders may 
argue that a "nation" has not historically existed, in the face of threat or 
challenge it can come into being relatively quickly and with a high degree 
of both coherence and commitment in cases of mutual preservation. What 
is important, however, is if a sufficient majority of members of a group 
that reflects a number of key characteristics claim for themselves a national 
identity, and, in particular, if they are prepared to fight for it, then the claim 
is ultimately their own to :make. 
SELF-DETERMINATION 
The claim of self-determination assumes that the bonded political community 
of a nation has no prior capacity to determine its own affairs, but should do 
so. This is, at one level, a normative claim arising, in the first instance, out 
of the Wilsonian-Leninist reorganization of Europe into nations that had 
previously been subsumed under greater empires at the end of the First World 
War. The logic of this process flowed into the post-World War II period, in 
which Europe's overseas colonies sought independence. However, as many 
post-colonial states were based on colonies that did not necessary reflect the 
unity or distinction of pre-existing ethnic identities, and that many such 
states at best had difficulty in establishing a non-ethnic (i.e. civic) form of 
national identity, there have continued to be numerous unresolved claims 
to separate national identity. 
This, then, leads to a potential for competition between the nation 
as a bonded political group, and the state (Griffiths 2003). A "state" may 
be confluent with, but is analytically distinct from, "nation". The state, as 
it is generally understood in the contemporary sense, refers to a specific 
and delineated area (Smith 1986b, p. 235) in which a government embeds 
institutionalized political and judicial authority (Evans 1995) and claims 
a monopoly over the legitimate use of force within its sovereign territory 
(Krader 1976, p. 13). States regard themselves, prima focie, as legitimate. 
Hence, any claim against the state is in their view, ipso facto, illegitimate. 
Claims against the state from within deny the state's implicit claim to 
representation on the basis of legitimacy. As defining and protecting 
territorial sovereignty is integral to their being, states, therefore, logicaHy 
reject separatist claims. Further, while assertions of national self-determination 
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may be supported in principle in international law and appear to reflect 
the claims of civil and political rights (in relation to self-determination), 
they are not explicitly supported. There is no international legal mechanism 
for redress of separatist claims, and if there was it would probably have 
little binding capacity given the relative weakness of international political 
institutions (for example, the United Nations) when compared to the 
specifically located power of states (Packer 1998, 1999, 2000a, 2000b). 
That is, as a reflection of realpolitik, claims to separation from the state 
are only as strong as their capacity to be asserted. 
MEDIATED SOLUTIONS 
Mediated solutions are therefore intended to act as a "compromise between 
self-determination and the sanctity of borders" (Graham 2000). In that 
mediated solutions based on political compromise have been proposed as a 
method for resolving separatist conflicts, they have increasingly come to take 
shape around a core set of ideas, commonly referred to as "earned sovereignty". 
Key characteristics of such mediated outcomes generally include: 
1. a multi-stage process of implementation 
2. the sharing of sovereignty, or constitutional authority, where the state 
(or, an international organization) and the sub-state entity may, each, 
exercise some sovereign or constitutional authority and functions over 
the territory in question 
(a) the conditional devolution of sovereignty or constitutional authority 
in a given territory through the phasing out of preceding sovereign 
authority and the phasing in of a local authority. This is intended 
to allow the ceding state both the opportunity for adjustment and 
to help provide surety around the intentions and capacities of the 
aspiring state. The second type of limit or conditionality placed 
on any arrangement constitutes conditional sovereignty, where the 
aspiring state is required to meet certain benchmarks such as human 
rights enforcement, respect for minority rights and so on before it 
may acquire increased sovereignty. 
(b) conditionalities placed upon the sovereign reach of the central 
government, and the extent of local powers. This implies limitations 
on the extent of the autonomous authority and some of the functions 
of the autonomous region. 
( c) constrained or limited sovereignty which may manifest as autonomy. 
federalism or confederation 
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3. the necessity of building new institutions or adapting existing institutions 
prior to the determination of the final status of political devolution, often 
with the assistance of the international community, by which a state is 
able to manifest its organizational capacity 
4. a mechanism for the determination of the final status of the territory 
in question, where the relationship between the existing state and the 
aspiring state is articulated, usually by a vote of the aspiring state's 
population and with the consent and under the supervision of the 
international community (Williams and Pecci 2004, p. 4; Hooper and 
Williams 2004; Scharf 2004). 
At its most basic, the "earned sovereignty" model entails the conditional and 
progressive devolution of sovereign powers and authority from a "parent" 
state to a sub-state entity under international, preferably multinational, 
supervision. This is generally made available through a peace process as a 
multi-stage approach to address the issue of the final political status of the 
sub-state entity, or as a peaceful recognition of the legitimacy of a claim to 
test sub-state desire for separate status. The case of East Timor reflects a 
number of elements of such a process. 
While mediated solutions such as "earned sovereignty" are legitimate 
attempts to work past some of the problems of the state-secessionist 
dichotomy, it also has a number of negative features. These include it being 
reliant on international goodwill (which may be undermined by disinterest 
or "realist" strategic self-interest) and being reliant on the agreement of 
the sovereign state to cede authority. Very often, such an agreement is also 
reliant upon the majority peoples of the state to accept such an outcome. A 
further difficulty is the common and usually unresolved issue of minorities 
within the proposed new state. 10 And, not least, there is the problem of a 
mediated outcome not being the preferred method of achieving a resolution 
to competing claims as opposed to a settlement by force of arms. 
The role of the mediator in the establishment of autonomy is also critical. 
A mediator may also have a role in seeking the participation of agreement 
monitors or peacekeepers, without who, breaches of agreements are possible 
and, in most cases, probable. Organizations providing such monitors or 
peacekeepers must be willing to commit them for an extended period, 
commonly of not less than two years. Mediators or peacekeepers can derive 
from a unilateral source but, given the potential for a conflict of interest, 
generally derive from a wider range of sources. The Norwegian role in the 
Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission was buttressed by monitors from other E.U. 
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states, while the Aceh Monitoring mission was an E.U. initiative, comprising 
monitors from most E.U. states but also from other ASEAN states. Similarly, 
Interfet in East Timor was led by Australian forces, but comprised forces 
from twenty-three states. 
The UN as a source of peacekeepers in particular has been regarded as 
ideal on one hand, representing the global community rather than poten-
tially narrow state interest. However, it has also had three key drawbacks; 
willingness of specific states to provide resources for such a mission, the often 
constrained rules under which the UN operates, and a more or less universal 
UN tendency towards bureaucratic inefficiency and, very often, incapacity. 
Potential contributor states may be unwilling to participate in UN-led 
missions, or may be unwilling to sustain commitment to such missions for 
an extended period (Guehenno 2008). 
With the possible exception of strategic interest, the claim of a dominant 
constituent group has no rational prior claim to the territory occupied by 
another group. Should it assert such a claim, it then undermines the basis 
of its own claim to territory, and manifestation as a state. That is, if the idea 
of sovereignty is to assert authority over a specific territory in pursuit of the 
commonly identified interests of a politically bonded group of people then, 
short of strategic interest, a state should have little concern over whether or 
not a geographically specific, differentiated politically bonded group within 
its claimed territory seeks its own territorially based self-determination. 
Where claims against this are made, they generally reflect the above noted 
strategic interest, often combined with economic interest and concerns about 
the protection of minorities within the claimed territory, as has occurred in 
Sri Lanka, Aceh, West Papua and Mindanao. 
While the case study countries formally recognize ethnic minorities, 
each has domin~nt ethnic majorities: Javanese in Indonesia, Sinhalese in Sri 
Lanka and Christians in the Philippines.° Where that civic national identity 
building project fails (e.g. Indonesia prior to 2004), or fails to maintain its 
earlier promise (e.g. Sri Lanka, Philippines), in so far as a national identity 
is constructed, it can in a functional sense tend to be ethnically or nor-
matively exclusivist, and hence alienate minority ethnic groups from the 
national project. 
By way of illustration, as noted by Miller in this volume, expectations 
within Aceh upon Indonesia's independence were that the post-colonial 
independent state would attain a high level of autonomy within a loose federal 
framework, so as to functionally determine its own affairs. However, Aceh's 
loss of provincial status and Indonesia's reorganization as a unitary state was 
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regarded as betrayal, leading to rebellion (Reid 2004; Kell 1995). The failure 
of the "special administrative" status of Aceh intended to resolve this conflict 
led to the Free Aceh Movement (1976-2005) (see Miller in this volume). 
The situation was somewhat different in West Papua, as a later 
inclusion into the state (functionally 1963, formally 1969) (see Singh in 
this volume). In this case, initial aspirations were oriented towards complete 
independence, rather than being subsumed into Indonesia (GoN 1961, pp. 
10-14). Thus, the aspirations of independence were replaced by what many 
in West Papua viewed as a further form of colonialism. Similar was the 
situation of East Timor, which proclaimed independence on 27 November 
1975, in the hope of achieving international recognition to deter an 
imminent Indonesian invasion. On 7 December 197 5, however, Indonesia 
formally invaded East Timor, 12 ushering in a new era of colonialism, until 
20 September 1999 (after which there was an interim UN administration 
until 2002) (see Soares in this volume). In Sri Lanka, initial hopes for post-
independence development were in significant part met by a democratic 
government presiding over relatively high levels of human development. 13 
However, an assertion of Sinhalese majority rights at the expense of the 
Tamil minority quickly alienated much of the Tamil population, leading 
to communal discord and violence (see Uyangoda and Sahadevan in 
this volume). 
In East Timor, the UN mediator monitored and, following a UN-
supervised ballot (and brief forced withdrawal), oversaw peacemaking, 
peacekeeping and institution building. Alternatives to this general model 
generally focus on other than complete independence, including types of 
partial devolution, including localized decision-making (Sri Lanka under 
the 1987 Inda-Sri Lanka Accord), regional autonomy (Aceh, Hong Kong 
and Bangsamoro14), federation (proposed by both the Government of Sri 
Lanka and the LTTE in March 2003 (RNMFA 2003) and confederation 
(as mooted by the LTTE until November 2007). The main difficulties with 
these alternatives, in particular with localized decision making and regional 
autonomy is that the devolved powers may be easily subverted in practice, 
meaning that the form but not necessarily the substance of separatist claims is 
addressed. A further implication of this is that separatist claims may continue 
or resurface. 
In Aceh, international pressure for a resolution to that conflict quickly 
developed following the 2004 tsunami that left around 200,000 people 
dead or missing and destroyed much of its infrastructure. The Indonesian 
government had been seeking a resolution to the Aceh conflict under the terms 
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of its "special autonomy" package, and sought mediation by the Helsinki-
based Crisis Management Initiative. On 22 December 2004, GAM agreed 
to CMI mediated talks. The tsunami struck two days later, and while it 
was not the reason for the talks, it did act as a catalyzer and compeller. 
GAM accepted a more genuine autonomy under the term "self-government", 
including greater local democratization, with the government agreeing 
to external monitoring of the eventual agreement by an E. U.-led Aceh 
Monitoring Mission (Ahtissari 2006). 
In West Papua, the Indonesian government has said it would talk with 
separatist leaders, but only within Indonesia and without international 
mediation. These two criteria were rejected by West Papuan separatist leaders. 15 
In principle, however, negotiations had been agreed to. In Sri Lanka, however, 
negotiations had at best achieved a ceasefire (2002-January 2008) but, unlike 
the 2005 Aceh resolution, without attempting to address, substantively, the 
underlying causes of the separatist conflict. As a consequence, this ceasefire 
only entrenched existing positions and, when circumstances changed around 
the agreement, the agreement itself began to unravel. In this respect, peace 
agreements, regardless of whether they contain measures to address substantive 
claims, only succeed in so far as the parties to the agreement honour both 
the letter and the spirit of the agreement. If the agreement does not address 
substantive issues and there is no clearly identified mechanism by which the 
aspect is envisioned to proceed, it is commonly only a matter of time before 
the ceasefire collapses. 
Other factors that also play a critical role in separatist conflict resolu-
tion include the capacity of the mediation party, the extent of the ((parent" 
state government to negotiate sovereignty, the extent to which causal issues 
underlining separatist claims are addressed, international guarantees and 
sanctions, agreement monitoring, the capacity for extended multilateral 
peacekeeping operations, and the extent of commitment to institution and 
capacity building measures. It is also imperative that representative parties 
to the talks have the capacity to legitimately represent their constituencies, 
and are able to compel compliance with their decisions among potential or 
actual dissenters. 
In summary, autonomy or other mediated solutions to separatist conflict 
appear to take a number of increasingly conventional features of negotia-
tion processes intended to assist resolving separatist conflict. This idea 
has problematic features, these include a prima facie assumption that the 
complete or partial sovereignty for the autonomous region is a legitimate 
condition. While many and perhaps most separatist movements have some 
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legitimacy to their claims, based on ethnicity, t·erritory and a sense of lack 
of belonging to the "parent" state, the assumption that the parent state will 
negotiate away elements of its sovereignty contradict the conventional sense 
of state sovereignty. Few states are willing to do this, and most that do only 
do so through a lack of options. That is, mediated outcomes that reduce 
state sovereignty are implicitly pro-separatist in its outlook, which may be 
a legitimate perspective but is unlikely to earn the trust of guardians of 
parent states. To this end, autonomy proposals must be neutrally balanced 
to allow parent states to engage in negotiation without understanding 
that, to paraphrase Oscar Wilde, the status of the claimant state has been 
established, and they are only haggling over the terms. 
The mediated model also aspires to a universality of application, especially 
in its "earned sovereignty'' guise, which demonstates both the strength and 
the weakness of the legal academics who have tended to dominate discussion 
of the idea. Attempts to codify a conflict mediation model appear to be 
intended to serve as a kind of statute for the resolution of separatist conflicts. 
Yet, while many and perhaps most of the abstract underlying features of 
such conflicts are common enough, short of a lack of self-determination 
being given the status of a crime against humanity, there is no global legal 
mechanism which could impose such a statute. Nor, in a world that to 
a large degree remains based on both the legal and practical inviolability 
of sovereign states, are states likely to recognize such a statute. As a conse-
quence, one of the realities of conflict negotiation that remains intact, is 
that the negotiating table is the place where the rules of the game are made 
as the game progresses and are, in large part, determined by the respective 
capacities of the bargaining parties. In reality, a state in a relatively weaker 
position will concede more, and a state in a relatively stronger position will 
concede less (Habeeb 1988). 
Finally, given that sovereignty is the principal reason for the being of the 
state, placing it on the table as a prima facie point of negotiation is likely to 
lead to automatic state rejection. It may be in practice that any negotiation, 
which implies compromise, will lead to a practical reduction in the extent of 
state sovereignty. But this need not be posited as an implied outcome in order 
to achieve a successful resolution. What is more of concern, and relevance, 
is that any negotiated agreement be codified in ways that are consistent and 
mutually agreeable and, so far as is able, enshrined. The principal method 
of achieving this enshrinement is through constitutional amendment or 
rewriting. Employing "constitutionality" rather than '(sovereignty" then 
sidesteps the issue of sovereignty while at the same time formalizing and, in 
legal terms, guaranteeing the negotiated agreement. 
30 Damien Kingsbury 
This then brings the process of negotiation back to first principle issues; 
what does each party claim, why do they claim it, and can the underlying 
concerns that inform their claim be met by an alternative arrangement. 
In most cases of separatism, the claim for a new state is based on the 
failure of the existing state to adequately address the legitimate concerns 
of a territorially specific ethnic group. This is usually as a consequence 
of the failure of the state to regard, both, its citizens as equal and their 
concerns as equally important. This then raises the question of the origins 
and nature of the state, and whether this can be changed to accommodate 
the legitimate grievances of separatist claimants, whether there is sufficient 
capacity to change or trust in such change, or whether the conflict has 
become so bitterly entrenched that the only option is for a degree of 
separation or divorce. Assuming no or little capacity for state change, or a 
lack of trust in state change, then partial sovereignty, autonomy, federation 
or confederation may be acceptable solutions. In each of these circumstances, 
a return to and reliance upon law as the basis for legitimacy appears as 
a necessary precondition. This implies a focus on constitutionality as the 
primary guarantor of political arrangements, rather than the more blunt 
claims of sovereignty or its diminution. The proposal put here, then, is that 
separatist conflict can be resolved through a mediated approach intended 
to institute or re-institute state or sub-state rule of law. The outcome of 
such a process will, therefore, be what could be referred to as "mediated 
constitutionality''. 
Notes 
3 
4 
See Kirschner (2007), Williams and Pecci (2004), Scharf (2004), Williams 
(2003), Hooper and Williams (2003), Heyman (2003), Bugajski, Hitchner and 
Williams (2002). 
Larmore, in Weinestock and Nadeau (2004), p. 106, also Ober (2000), Cicero 
(1998). 
See Chand and Coffman (2008) on reduced state economic capacity. 
Luis (2000), Englebert (2000), Cornwell (1999) and Hirschmann (1987) discuss 
this phenomenon in relation to sub-Saharan African states. 
The claims of the LTTE have shifted at different times according to changing 
circumstances, and have included federalism, confederation and absolute 
independence. 
See di Tiro (1984), Prabahkaran (2006), Ondowame (2007), Lingga (2002), 
Joliffe (2001) in relation to the nationalist ideologies of, respectively, Aceh, Tamil 
Eelam, West Papua, Bangsamoro and East Timor. 
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10 
12 
13 
14 
By way of illustration of the local meaning of autonomy, the local military 
organized "pro-autonomy" militias referred to themselves, overall, as the Pasukan 
Perjuang lntegrasi (Integration Fighting Force). 
A similar claim can also be made for multi-ethnic states that are compelled 
through a variety of circumstances to come together as political unities, Boznia-
Herzegovina being a case in point. 
Payne (1969), for example, refers extensively to the post-revolutionary but pre-
industrial nation of France. 
This refers to both further minorities as well as residual elements of the original 
majority, e.g. Sinhalese and Muslims in the claimed Tamil Eelam and Gayo, 
Alas and transmigrant (predominantly Javanese) minorities in Aceh and similar 
transmigrant and economic migrant minorities in West Papua. 
Assuming religious difference as the basis for cultural difference in this 
instance. 
Indonesian forces had engaged in cross-border incursion for the previous ten 
weeks. 
As defined by the Human Development Index. 
Bangsamoro in the southern Philippines was, at the time of writing, being 
negotiated between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front, with agreement on the concept of an autonomous admini-
strative region, but talks stalling over technical details, including seabed 
boundaries and division of economic resources. 
This position was confirmed a number of times but, most uniformly, at a meeting 
of leaders of separatist groups at a secret location in September 2007, at which 
the author was present. 
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